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Abstract 
 
We explore consumer trade-offs between better 
performance through tailoring of online services to 
their individual needs and greater privacy as a result of 
reduced disclosure of personal information. We show 
that individuals have different willingness to accept loss 
of privacy that is a function of (1) the individual and 
his/her preferences, because the variation in demands 
for privacy is not uniform across individuals, (2) the 
service Domain, because individuals demand more 
privacy in some Domains than they do in others and (3) 
these differences themselves differ among consumers as 
well. 
 
Keywords: Tradeoffs between privacy and enhanced 
web services, online privacy, online personalization. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Despite claims to the contrary, we find that privacy 
is not yet dead. Our study shows that privacy remains 
an important issue to our study population (primarily 
college students), and that concerns vary among indi-
viduals and across different Domains. Here we define 
Domains
1
 as areas of online services that are distinct 
from one another with respect to the content of services 
provided to the user, the information needed from the 
user in order to personalize the service (e.g., locating a 
coffee shop vs. providing driving directions), and our 
classification of the specific area of potential sensitivity 
(e.g., political preferences, sexual behavior, potential 
medical problems).  
 
2.  Background 
2.1. Privacy Concerns 
 
Privacy is defined on three dimensions. One di-
mension of privacy, secrecy, concerns concealing 
information to prevent it from being released acciden-
tally or discovered by information seekers [19, 29, 32]. 
A second dimension of privacy, seclusion, refers to a 
state of peace, with freedom from unwanted interrup-
tion [19, 29]. Finally, the third dimension of privacy, 
autonomy, ―concerns freedom from observation,‖ 
leading to freedom of action [19, 29]. While all three 
                                                             
1
 As with Domain, all variables and terms used in this paper that are 
used with precise meanings in our research will be capitalized to alert 
the reader. 
dimensions of privacy – secrecy, seclusion, and auton-
omy – are important considerations in evaluating priva-
cy regulations [19], we are concerned primarily with 
the first definition of privacy – the concealment of 
information. This is similar to the definition of privacy 
used in psychology literature [38]. Following Awad and 
Krishnan and Stone et al., we define information priva-
cy as ―the ability of the individual to personally control 
information about one’s self‖ [4, 33]. When individuals 
choose to provide their personal information in return 
for enhanced online services, they may believe that they 
are handing over information to a party whose use of 
that information is now outside their control.  
Firms’ customization and personalization of online 
services has undeniably experienced significant tech-
nological progress [12, 26, 31, 35, 36]. In return for 
using these online services, consumers are confronted 
with advertisements on the website where the services 
are located. Through the use of cookies as well as 
voluntary disclosure, a range of consumer information 
may be collected through these services – from a simple 
email address to a complex set of search term histories, 
site preferences, past purchases, credit card informa-
tion, physical mailing addresses, and so forth. Compa-
nies’ possession of such rich datasets can benefit con-
sumers through tailored services that can speed up 
purchase transactions, provide better search results, and 
other services. However, the potential for consumer 
harm exists, as in the case of Amazon’s alleged diffe-
rential pricing of DVDs based on customers’ purchase 
histories and demographics [5]. For firms, such infor-
mation can serve as a competitive advantage in envi-
ronments where differentiation is key to their survival, 
or as a public relations nightmare as in Facebook’s 
attempts at privacy policy changes, which has caused a 
rise in concern over privacy (see, for example, [8, 9, 15, 
23, 32, 33, 39, 47, 49]). This motivated the study of 
consumers’ tradeoffs between better performance 
through tailoring of websites to their individual needs 
and greater privacy as a result of reduced disclosure of 
personal information.  
In the following section, we review prior literature. 
The third section discusses this paper’s theoretical 
model and hypotheses. The fourth section reviews data 
methodology. The fifth section presents results and 
analyses. Section six presents a discussion of results 
and their business and policy implications, as well as 
potential areas for further research. We conclude by 
 addressing some of the limitations of our study. 
 
2.2. Prior Literature 
 
As firms, employers, advertisers, governments, and 
other parties increase their technological ability to track 
individuals’ behavior and information, privacy concerns 
become more important for politicians and academics 
of all fields, including law, economics, political 
science, psychology, and others [19].  
Even with legislative protections [13, 19, 28] in 
place to protect individual privacy, consumers still have 
reservations in providing more and more details of their 
Internet habits to firms. Studies by Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers and Harris showed that online shopping would 
increase if consumers knew that retailers would not 
misuse their personal information [1, 3, 16].  
It is necessary to find the proper balance between 
privacy and customization. Quantification of privacy 
valuations has been attempted in various contexts, as in 
privacy with regards to location data [11], marketers’ 
call lists [37], and online activity [15]. In a conjoint 
analysis of students in United States and Singapore 
universities, Hann et al. identified three segments of the 
population: privacy guardians (the majority) who value 
privacy highly, information sellers who provide person-
al information in return for monetary rewards, and 
convenience seekers who provide personal information 
in return for increased convenience [15].  
However, other researchers have identified factors 
that can increase individuals’ willingness to provide 
private information. These results do not appear to 
apply only to ―information sellers‖ or ―convenience 
seekers.‖ For example, in both field and laboratory 
experiments, Hui et al. showed that if provided with 
small monetary incentives, individuals became more 
willing to disclose private information [20, 21]. In his 
2006 review of economic analyses of privacy, Hui 
concluded that consumers are not as sensitive to the 
sharing of personal information as previously believed 
and as previously reported in the literature (see surveys 
and experiments referenced by Hui [21] for example, 
[1, 7, 22, 35, 36, 54, 56]), and that economic solutions, 
such as monetary incentives, increased convenience, or 
the provision of resources, can mediate the exchange of 
information [14, 19, 23, 27]. In addition Chellappa and 
Sin showed that vendor trust-building activities, such as 
improving their brand image, can reduce consumers’ 
concerns for privacy [10]. They showed that privacy is 
not absolute, and that consumers may give up more 
information in return for benefits [10]. Again, these 
results do not appear to apply only to ―information 
sellers‖ or ―convenience seekers‖ as the authors did not 
identify a group of consumers (i.e., ―privacy guar-
dians‖) in their study population (n=243) who were 
particularly insensitive to trust as a mediating factor. 
Furthermore, Chellappa showed that consumers’ per-
ceptions of privacy, security, and trust vary between 
online and offline transactions—even if the transactions 
occur through the same company (e.g., Best Buy online 
and Best Buy brick and mortar) [9]. 
We believe that the model of Hann, while sup-
ported by his data, was incomplete. Just as monetary 
incentives, trust, online vs. offline interactions, and 
other factors can affect all individuals’, and not just 
―information sellers’‖ or ―convenience seekers’,‖ 
willingness to provide information in return for en-
hanced services, we believe that with a large sample 
size and a wider range of Domains people will, on 
average, seem to be less polarized and less different.  
Some will protect privacy in some Domains while some 
will protect privacy in others, but few individuals will 
be consistently more concerned than average or consis-
tently less concerned than average. Indeed, as men-
tioned above, the results of other researchers have 
shown different results. 
  
3. Theory and Hypotheses 
3.1. Theory 
 
Following Awad and Krishnan [4], we use utility 
maximization theory to study consumers’ tradeoffs 
between better performance through tailoring of web-
sites to their individual needs and greater privacy as a 
result of reduced disclosure of personal information. 
While Rust et al. [30] and other researchers have used 
utility maximization theory to examine consumer 
privacy, there are limitations to the use of the theory. 
For example, although utility maximization theory 
argues that consumers make decisions to maximize 
their economic utility, the majority of consumers do not 
make explicit financial calculations of the costs and 
benefits of social exchanges [6, 17]; however, previous 
research has shown that consumers do, to a certain 
extent, consider the tradeoffs involved [5, 17, 18, 19, 
38, 40, 51]. 
The ―privacy calculus‖ theory argues that individu-
als’ decisions to reveal or not reveal their information is 
dependent on the potential benefits vs. potential nega-
tive consequences of providing their information [22, 
24, 25, 34]. Factors that contribute to the privacy calcu-
lus include ―personality and culture-based privacy 
attitudes, the type of information to be disclosed and its 
[deviation] from the average, the recipient, the value 
that is being assigned to personalization benefits, the 
extent to which users know what information has been 
disclosed and can control its usage, and various trust-
establishing factors‖ [22]. Further, Huberman et al. 
showed that the price consumers demanded for that 
information varied with the sensitivity (broadly con-
strued of that information: consumers who were signifi-
 cantly overweight or underweight demanded a higher 
price for releasing information on their weight) [18]. 
However, it should be noted that consumers often lack 
proper information or motivation to make privacy 
decisions, often having incorrect beliefs about whether 
certain pieces of information can be linked back to their 
identities or lacking the expertise to interpret privacy 
policies [22].  
 Our study focuses on whether enhanced online 
services (as measured through time savings via perso-
nalization of the online service to the consumer) have 
an effect on consumer willingness to disclose their 
personal information.  Providing more information 
should represent a greater cost, while more time savings 
represents a greater benefit.  If sensitivities vary as we 
expect, consumers will differ in the savings they de-
mand before sharing information, and their demands 
will vary across Domains. Since subjects’ demograph-
ics may affect their responses, we control for gender 
and age.  
 
3.2. Hypotheses  
 
We hypothesized that individuals have different 
willingness to accept a loss of privacy that is a function 
of (1) the individual and his or her preferences, because 
preferences for privacy are not uniform across individ-
uals, (2) the service Domain because demand for priva-
cy varies with the sensitivity of the Domain, and (3) 
variation among Domains that also vary across individ-
uals. We explored the following, demonstrating:  
 
Hypothesis 0: Individuals value their time and they 
value more time more.  
 
 We study consumer tradeoffs between enhanced 
online services (as demonstrated through time saved) 
and decrease in privacy by first determining that indi-
viduals do value their time and that they value more 
time more. While this hypothesis does not address 
privacy explicitly, it (1) assesses whether individual 
experimental subjects do value their time and (2) it is 
critical to our experimental design and if it were not 
supported it would be impossible for us to assess any of 
the hypotheses that follow.   
 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals are not the same (e.g., they 
do not value their time or privacy equally). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals are not consistent across 
Domains (e.g., the variance of their responses to the 
Domain questions is not zero (0) and they value privacy 
in some Domains more than in others). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Individuals are not uniformly more or 
less sensitive than average across Domains; individuals 
consider some Domains more sensitive and are less 
willing than average to share information in one or 
more Domains, and these same individuals are more 
willing than average to share information in other 
Domains. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Individuals can be grouped with respect 
to their sensitivity over privacy across certain Domains; 
while individuals do vary, there are groups of individu-
als who are clustered and whose concerns for privacy 
are largely in agreement across Domains.  
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
 We develop a set of experiments to test our hypo-
theses using a survey instrument.  
 
4.1. Variable Definitions 
 
Domain—areas of online services that are distinct 
from one another with respect to the type of services 
provided, the information needed from the user in order 
to personalize the service, and individuals’ perceptions 
of the sensitivity of the topics addressed.  Medical 
evaluation, advice for the unemployed, descriptions of 
aberrant sexual behavior, and restaurant reviews are all 
likely to be viewed very differently by different indi-
viduals, as providing home address or income levels 
might be. Given our research hypotheses, we choose 
Domains that we expected would reveal differences 
among individuals—e.g., Domains that we expected to 
be sensitive to some, to all, or to none of the experi-
mental subjects. We used some Domains from previous 
researchers (e.g., financial services and travel services 
[14, 25]). We used the following Domains: medical 
symptom checker, sexual support, violent games, sex-
ual fantasy games, children’s games, financial help, 
map directions, relationship counseling, political com-
mentaries, tutoring, finding restaurants, movie ratings, 
and finding coffee shops. 
 Feelings Towards Privacy (FTP)—As a proxy 
measure of the costs to individuals for revealing their 
private information, we asked subjects for their feelings 
towards having information being recorded about their 
internet usage through a five-point Likert-scaled item 
(Table 1). 
 Click Equivalents (Click(s))—As will be de-
scribed, we asked subjects questions regarding tradeoffs 
between enhanced services in search and revelation of 
private information from the thirteen Domains. For 
each Domain, subjects received a hypothetical situation 
and then asked to choose between two services – one 
service tracked the individual’s behavior but saved him 
or her X amount of time (X ranged from 0 to 60 mi-
nutes), the other did not track the individual’s behavior 
but did not save him or her time. Subjects who chose 
the service that tracked his or her behavior indicated 
how much time, at a minimum, the service must save 
him or her. (Options ranged from 0 to 60 minutes at 
 different increments.) In order to control for differences 
in individuals' absolute preferences for time, responses 
were standardized into "Click Equivalents," where each 
Click corresponds to 5 minutes. We do not use person-
specific valuation of time due to concerns for unob-
served heterogeneity (e.g., wealth), which could bias 
the results or make averages difficult to compare. 
 Above Average—For each subject, we calculated 
the Above Average, defined as the number of times the 
subject’s Click value exceeded the average value by at 
least half the standard deviation of the responses for 
each Domain question.  We followed this procedure to 
widen the range in which an individual's response 
would be counted as average in order to account for the 
unlikelihood that individuals would be exactly average. 
The average value used in these calculations corres-
ponded to the average from which the comparison was 
made (e.g., average of female responses for the female 
histogram). 
 Below Average—We also calculated the corres-
ponding Below Average (i.e., the number of times the 
subject’s Click value was below the average value by at 
least half the standard deviation of the responses for 
each Domain question) for each individual. Similarly, 
the average value used in these calculations corres-
ponded to the average from which the comparison was 
made. 
 Difference—Finally, we subtracted Below Average 
from Above Average to find the Difference.  
 Social Networking Usage (SNU)—We asked 
subjects if they use social networking sites like Face-
book and Twitter, as well as how often they use these 
services (Table 2). We are interested to see if there is a 
correlation between SNU and FTP. 
 Internet Usage (IU)—We asked subjects how 
many hours per day, on average, they spend actively 
using the internet (Table 2). We are interested to see if 
there is a correlation between IU and FTP. 
 Reservation Club Card (RCC)—We asked subjects 
how much they would be willing to pay for a Reserva-
tion Club Card if it saved them X amount of time in 
waiting in lines (e.g., for tickets to a movie), where X 
ranged from 15 minutes to 90 minutes a month. We are 
interested to see if individuals value their time, and if 
so, whether they value more time more. 
 
4.2. Research Design 
 
 The study population was drawn from the Wharton 
Behavioral Lab (WBL) participant list. Participants 
from the WBL are recruited through on-campus fliers 
and through email invitations.  
Given that we are examining the tradeoff between 
privacy and customized internet services, the popula-
tion of interest is adults who use the internet – although 
they need not be equally experienced users. See Table 3 
for demographic information. 
The experimental procedure is straightforward. 
While sitting in a private cubicle within the Wharton 
Behavioral Lab, participants opened the relevant survey 
and filled out the informed consent form prior to begin-
ning the survey. Participants came to the Wharton 
Behavioral Lab once. They completed the tasks and 
filled out the questionnaires
2
. The main objectives of 
this research project is to demonstrate that the willing-
ness to accept (WTA) decreased privacy in exchange 
for better services does exist and does vary across 
individuals and across Domains.  
We hypothesize individuals have different WTAs 
that are a function of both the individual and the service 
Domain. To assess both existence and differences, we 
conducted surveys to quantify the WTA decreased 
privacy with regards to online services along thirteen 
Domains. We explored the following ideas: 
1. To show that individuals do value their time, and 
place greater value on more time saved (independent 
of privacy), we asked subjects how much they would 
be willing to pay for versions of a Reservation Club 
Card that would save them varying amounts of time. 
2. Additionally, we determined how many hours a day 
subjects use the internet, whether they participate in 
services like Facebook or Twitter or other social net-
works, and how they feel about Domain-independent 
information like having Google record their search 
history or their email messages sent.  
3. We proceeded to ask participants regarding tradeoffs 
between enhanced services in search and revelation 
of private information from thirteen Domains. For 
each Domain, subjects received a hypothetical situa-
tion and then chose between two services – one ser-
vice tracked the individual’s behavior but saved him 
or her X amount of time (options ranged from 0 to 60 
minutes), the other did not track the individual’s be-
havior but did not save him or her time.  
 
Note that we did not ask subjects to reveal private 
information related to these Domains (e.g., there were 
no questions related to the subjects’ health).  However, 
we did ask them how they feel about revealing informa-
tion from that Domain to an online service provider.  
Individuals' responses were standardized into 
"Click" equivalents, as described above. 
 
4.3. Instrument Validity  
 
Before conducting the survey, we asked a col-
league with expertise in questionnaire design to ex-
amine the item for face validity. After the instrument 
was developed, it was pilot tested on 16 undergraduate 
                                                             
2 The survey can be found online at 
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~clemons/PrivacySurvey.pdf.  
 students at the Wharton Behavioral Lab. Feedback was 
solicited to correct any question or directions that were 
confusing or ambiguous, leading to the final survey 
instrument. 
 
5. Experimental Results 
 
Hypothesis 0:  Individuals value their time and 
they value more time more. Applying linear regres-
sion to subjects’ responses to the Reservation Club 
Card (RCC) question, and assuming a Y-intercept of 0, 
we found a nearly perfect linear relationship (Multiple 
R = 0.9993, R
2
 = 0.9986, Standard Error = 0.5023) 
between subjects’ average amount willing to pay and 
the minutes saved by the RCC (Figure 1). Applying the 
same analysis to the individual responses (after Winso-
rizing one subject’s responses ($100, $200, $250, $525, 
$1000 for 15, 30, 45, 60, and 90 minutes, respectively) 
by replacing them with the second most extreme values 
– see Figure 2), we found a similarly strong, though 
weaker, relationship (Multiple R = 0.7075, R
2
 = 0.5005, 
Standard Error = 10.2388). It is also evident that the 
range of subjects’ willingness to pay increases with the 
amount of time savings: $0-$30 for 15 minutes, $0-$40 
for 30 minutes, $0-$45 for 45 minutes, $0-$60 for 60 
minutes, $0-$100 for 90 minutes. 
Subjects’ responses to how they felt regarding their 
information being recorded (i.e., very willing, willing, 
indifferent, against, and strongly against information 
being recorded about their internet use) were trans-
formed into dummy variables. We did not use subjects’ 
Likert-valued responses since the Feelings Towards 
Privacy (FTP) variable is not continuous.  
 Regression of subjects’ average Clicks across all 
Domains on their FTP responses revealed significant 
effects of the dummy variables corresponding to indif-
ferent (p = 0.018), against (p = 0.0001), and strongly 
against (p = 0.0001) on individuals’ average Click 
values (with coefficients 1.7235, 3.3933, and 4.0861 
respectively). Similar regression of subjects’ average 
Clicks across all Domains on their Social Networking 
Usage (SNU) (hours) and Internet Usage (IU) (hours) 
revealed significant effects from the same FTP dummy 
variables, but no predictive power from the SNU (p = 
0.584) or IU (p = 0.489) variables (see Tables A-B in 
Appendix
3
). These results suggests that while individu-
als’ stated preferences regarding privacy is predictive of 
how many Clicks are necessary for them to use a Do-
main service, their actual usage of privacy-revealing 
services (e.g., Facebook) does not correspond to their 
FTP; and thus, revealing a possible disconnect between 
individuals’ revealed and expressed preferences and 
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online Appendix, which can be found at 
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~clemons/PrivacyAppendix.pdf  
behavior. 
Hypothesis 1:  Individuals are not the same (e.g., 
they do not value their time and/or privacy equally). 
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparison of 
each subject’s set of responses to the RCC question 
showed a significant difference (p = 0.0001, see Table 
C in Appendix for full ANOVA statistics) between 
subjects’ responses, suggesting a difference among 
subjects in how they value their time with respect to the 
RCC.  One-way ANOVA of subjects’ responses (in 
Clicks) to the Domain questions showed a significant 
difference (p = 0.0001, see Table D in Appendix for 
full ANOVA statistics) among subjects’ set of 13 
responses. 
Hypothesis 2:  Individuals are not consistent 
across Domains (e.g., the standard deviation (SD) of 
their responses to the Domain questions is not zero 
(0)). One sample t-test of subjects’ average SDs over 
their Domain question responses (in Clicks) rejected the 
null hypothesis of  the SD=0, with p<0.0001. (Table 4). 
Hypothesis 3:  Individuals are not consistently 
more or less sensitive than average across Domains. 
If subjects are expected to be either hoarders or free 
providers of information, we would expect a histogram 
of the Difference to exhibit bimodality. Visual observa-
tions of the histograms for males does not indicate 
bimodality (Figure 3); for females, bimodality may be 
present given the 7 individuals who were above average 
in all Domains; and for the combined data, bimodality 
may also be present, possibly due to the influence of the 
female dataset. These results imply that subjects cannot 
easily be grouped into two distinct groups of hoarders 
and free providers of information – at least now without 
first separating them by gender (Table 5). A thought 
experiment may help to clarify this point. If all of our 
subjects were hoarders, we would expect one peak at 13 
in our distribution. If all of our subjects were free 
providers, we would similarly expect only one peak, but 
at -13. If individuals are as likely to be hoarders as free 
providers, half of our subjects would be hoarders and 
the other half free providers. We would then expect two 
peaks in our distribution, one at 13 and one at -13. We 
would also anticipate an expected average of the Dif-
ference to be 0. However, regardless of the ratio of 
hoarders to free providers within our study population, 
we would expect two peaks at the same locations, but 
with different magnitudes.  As observed in Table 2, this 
is not the case. We recognize that if all individuals’ 
sensitivities across Domains are not correlated we 
would expect Difference values to be clustered at 0. 
However, the presence of Difference values not con-
fined to only 13 or -13 suggests that there are individu-
als who are more sensitive in certain Domains than in 
others. Hence, there are individuals who are not consis-
tently more or less sensitive than average across Do-
 mains.  
Bivariate fit of Above Average by Gender for the 
combined dataset revealed no significant effects of 
gender (p = 0.2381). However, analysis of each Do-
main’s Click response by Gender showed significant 
effects of Gender on responses to Domain questions 3 
(p = 0.0001, playing military games) and 13 (p = 
0.0378, searching for a coffee shop), and almost signif-
icant effects on question 5 (p = 0.0554, playing a child-
ren’s game) (Table 6, also see Appendix Tables E-H for 
further details). For these Domain questions, males 
tended to have a lower Click value than females, sug-
gesting that males may have a lower sensitivity to these 
questions. There was not enough variation in other 
demographic variables for us to consider them. 
Service Domains are not the same with respect 
to individuals' concerns over privacy. One-way 
ANOVA analysis of each Domain’s Click values re-
vealed a significant difference across Domains (p = 
0.0001, see Appendix Table I for more details). 
Hypothesis 4:  Individuals can be grouped or 
clustered across collections of Domains with respect 
to their sensitivity to privacy over those Domains. 
Post-hoc Bonferroni comparison of each subject’s set of 
responses to the Domain questions revealed four groups 
of individuals based on their view of the Domain ques-
tions (in terms of Clicks). The Neutral Questions group 
had an average Click of 3.540; the Sex Questions group 
10.776; the Personal Questions group 6.924; and the 
Flippy Questions (occurring in both the Neutral and 
Personal Groups) group 5.172 (Table 7). In terms of 
subject types, we therefore have those who hoarders, 
privates (share only information in the Neutral Ques-
tions group), augmented privates (share information in 
the Neutral and Personal Question groups), and free-
providers (share information in all Domains). 
To identify individuals who may be hoarders of in-
formation, we calculated the number of subjects who 
were unwilling to share information across all 13 Do-
mains (average Click response = 13). Because no sub-
ject was willing to share information across all 13 
Domains, we calculated the number of potential free-
providers by enumerating those with an average Click 
response less than 2. As seen in Table 8, these individu-
als make up a relatively small percentage of the total 
study population, with slightly more males in the free-
provider group than females.  
Separating the data by gender revealed differences 
in how subjects perceived the Domain questions in the 
Neutral, Flippy, and Personal groups. Specifically, 
whereas females tended to view questions 1 (using a 
web portal to search health symptoms) and 3 (playing 
military games) as Personal, some males viewed them 
as Neutral while others see them as Personal; and 
whereas males viewed 13 (searching for a coffee shop) 
as Neutral, there were females who viewed it as Neutral 
and others who saw it as Personal (Table 7). Two-way 
ANOVA analysis on the effects of gender and question 
group on the average Clicks of each Question Group 
revealed significant effects from Question Group (p = 
0.0009) but not from Gender (p = 0.1099) (see Table J 
in Appendix for more details). 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Our present research is focused on understanding 
consumers’ willingness to compromise their privacy for 
enhanced services, and whether consumers can be 
neatly categorized as either hoarders or free providers 
of information. We began by showing that individuals 
do in fact value their time, that they value more time 
more, and that there is a difference among individuals 
in how they value their time (with respect to the Reser-
vation Club Card question). Further, we also showed 
that individuals do not value their privacy equally, in 
that their responses to the set of thirteen Domain ques-
tions are not equivalent to one another. Additionally, 
not all Domains are the same with regards to individu-
als’ concerns over privacy – each Domain’s set of 
responses is different, with individuals differing about 
which Domains they see as sensitive or not.  
We next showed that individuals are not consistent 
across Domains – they may be sensitive in one Domain, 
but insensitive in another. More specifically, individu-
als are not uniformly more or less sensitive than aver-
age across different Domains – they do not all fall 
neatly into categories of hoarders or free providers of 
information. While gender only has near significant 
effects (p = 0.0642) on how often an individual’s Click 
value is above average for each Domain question, our 
data showed that gender has a significant effect on 
individuals’ responses to Domain questions 3 (playing 
military games) and 13 (searching for a coffee shop), 
and almost significant effects on question 5 (playing a 
children’s game) – with males tending to have a lower 
Click value than females, suggesting that males may 
have a lower sensitivity to these questions. 
Previous research has shown that individuals’ con-
cerns over privacy across Domains are similar (Hann 
with health, travel, and financial web portals [15]) and 
willingness to disclose information is not influenced by 
the sensitivity of the information ([21]). We grouped 
individuals based on how they perceived the Domain 
questions, and categorized these questions into either 
the Neutral, Personal, Sex, or Flippy (both Neutral and 
Personal) Question groups. Our data showed that indi-
viduals consistently viewed Domains related to Travel 
Maps, Tutoring, Restaurant Searches, and Movie Rat-
ings as if they were non-sensitive (average Click for 
males 3.147, females 3.559, combined 3.395), and other 
questions as if  they were sensitive, i.e., those related to 
 Sex (average Click for males 10.395, females 11.028, 
combined 10.776). Assuming that the Sex questions are 
more sensitive than the Neutral questions, this set of 
results show that individuals’ willingness to disclose 
information is influenced by the individual’s perception 
of the sensitivity of the information. Further, our data 
show that these effects are in part correlated to gender 
differences. Specifically, whereas females tended to 
view questions 1 (using a web portal to search health 
symptoms) and 3 (playing military games) as Personal, 
males viewed them as both sensitive and non-sensitive; 
and whereas males viewed 13 (searching for a coffee 
shop) as non-sensitive, there were females who viewed 
it as non-sensitive and some as sensitive. It is interest-
ing that there are females whose Click values for ques-
tion 13 are within the Personal range, since the context 
of the question is similar to questions 11 (searching for 
a restaurant) and 12 (movie rating). One possible reason 
may be that while individuals do not necessarily visit 
restaurants near their homes and the movie rating 
service does not reveal their location, they may tend to 
visit coffee shops near their homes, and thereby would 
reveal their general location when using the service. 
Males’ possible different habits in coffee shop visits or 
perception of location data may explain why they do 
not exhibit this sensitivity. 
These results suggest that privacy policies must be 
constructed differently in the public and market arenas. 
With respect to public policy, privacy laws written as 
one-size-fits-all legislations may be optimal when 
compared to those tailored to specific groups and their 
privacy sensitivity. Just as mandatory seat belt laws and 
automobile and food safety standards are established to 
protect the population as a whole, as opposed to design-
ing them for specific groups of individuals who may or 
may not care about their safety, one-size-fits-all privacy 
legislations can serve to protect consumers who may 
not have any alternatives to the service at hand, have 
insufficient knowledge to protect themselves, and/or do 
not recognize the appropriate short term-long term 
tradeoffs (i.e., providing information for instant gratifi-
cation [1]).  
The implications of our results for marketing and 
web developers, however, are not as clear-cut. For 
service Domains that are uniformly and consistently 
seen as not sensitive, a one-size-fits-all privacy policy 
is appropriate, but for service Domains whose sensitivi-
ty is dependent on the consumer segment, and whose 
viability is dependent on being able to track consumers’ 
behavior, alternative approaches must be taken. Here, 
we offer two suggestions. For sensitive service Do-
mains whose services are free to the consumers, but 
where the tracking of individuals’ behaviors is neces-
sary (for example, in order to provide contextually 
relevant advertisements), anonymity is still possible.  
Service providers can issue specific and unique user-
names and passwords that are associated with each 
consumer and the records of his or her behavior, but 
that cannot be associated with individual identities after 
issued.  Of course, since no association with individuals 
is possible, if the user forgets his username or pass-
word, it is not possible to recover either.  In the case 
that the service is not free and the provider requires 
payment for the service, the establishment of payment 
intermediaries could still protect anonymity.  This 
would start with mechanism like PayPal, but one where 
there is anonymity outside the payment firm; the firm 
would bill individuals and pay service providers, ensur-
ing that the service provider would be unable to asso-
ciate that account with an individual’s identity outside 
the provider’s system[7, 8].  This would of course 
require an enormous leap of faith in the security of the 
payment vendor. 
Together, our results suggests that future research 
on privacy will require recognition that individuals’ 
concerns over privacy span a spectrum of areas, and 
that their attitudes can vary across Domains; this differs 
from the idea that individuals can be classified as 
hoarders or free providers.  Additionally, we now 
recognize that gender differences exist for behaviors in 
certain Domains. Public and corporate policies must be 
created to encompass gender, individual, and Domain 
differences, since a one-size-fits-all or a group-specific 
policy will not necessarily be optimal for the firms. 
 
7. Limitations 
 
There are several limitations to this study. First, in-
dicating that the study concerns online privacy may 
have led individual subjects at the Wharton Behavioral 
Lab to be more sensitive to issues of privacy, leading to 
biased responses not reflective of their true attitudes 
towards privacy. Second, the dichotomy between what 
individuals say and what individuals do implies that 
their responses to the survey may not be indicative of 
their revealed or true and intrinsic preferences [1, 2, 
22]. Third, our study population consisted primarily of 
college students (in line with previous studies on priva-
cy, e.g., Hann [15], Hui et al. 2004 [21]) and so our 
findings may not apply to other segments of the popula-
tion since students fall into a limited range on age, 
income, education, and awareness of issues in online 
technology, all of which may influence perception of 
risk.  
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